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T IMING AND SEQUENCING
OF POST-CONFL ICT
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PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS
IN SOUTH SUDAN
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DAVID J. FRANCIS
INTRODUCTION
..................................................................................................................................
BARELY three years after independence, the world’s newest state, South Sudan, imploded
in a violent war on  December , with the international media portraying the
conﬂict as simply about ethnicity and the all-too-familiar violent struggle for power in
Africa. All the signs of an imminent violent conﬂict were visible, but the new ruling and
governing elites in charge of the new state, as well as the international community,
failed to invest in post-independence nation-building and post-liberation-war peace-
building, thereby creating a conducive environment for the current conﬂict. Critical
failures include: the UN Mission in South Sudan’s cautious optimism amid increasing
violent political tensions; the international community’s preoccupation with prevent-
ing war with Khartoum Sudan over the oil-rich Abyei region; the leadership failures of
the new ruling elites and the curse of Liberation Movements in power; and the failure
to transform the South Sudan People’s Liberation Army into a professional national
army and the South Sudan Liberation Movement into a legitimate and democratically
accountable political party.
Based on extensive ﬁeld research in Sudan and South Sudan between  and
, this chapter argues that the international response to post-independence
nation-building and post-liberation-war peacebuilding were not predicated on coher-
ent and consistent timing and sequencing. I posit that in the particular case of South
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Sudan, it was the marked inconsistency, poor coordination, and lack of domestic
legitimacy and ownership of the post-liberation-war peacebuilding and nation-
building interventions that aggravated the fundamental grievances leading to the
outbreak of the December  civil war. If anything, the case study of South
Sudan demonstrates how events on the ground and the pursuit of the strategic
interests of the key stakeholders framed and determined the nature, scope, timing,
and even the sequencing of post-war peacebuilding and nation-building. But this
false start in South Sudan may just provide the opportunity for the international
community and, in particular, the Troika countries (USA, UK, and Norway) to play
a lead role in mobilizing international efforts to invest in state formation and
nation-building.
DETERMINANTS OF TIMING AND SEQUENCING
OF POST-WAR PEACEBUILDING
IN SOUTH SUDAN
..................................................................................................................................
The twenty-two-year liberation war that led to the political independence of South
Sudan from Sudan on  July  provided the opportunity for the intervention of
powerful national, regional, and external actors. The liberation war converted South
Sudan into a proxy for the extension and attainment of foreign, military/security,
geopolitical, and economic strategic interests of regional and external actors. With
the formal end of the war and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) in , which led to the deployment of the UNMission in Sudan (UNMIS), the
South Sudan Troika became the focal point for the mobilization of international support
for nation-building and post-war peacebuilding. The CPA, supported by the Troika
countries, the African Union, pivotal regional states such as Uganda, Kenya, and
Ethiopia, and the international community, presented an overtly optimistic approach
to nation-building in post-independence South Sudan. The CPA and the international
community gave only six years (–) for South Sudan to establish the foundations,
state governing institutions, policies, processes, and structures of statehood, in an
environment of extreme poverty, underdevelopment, and devastation caused by decades
of war. It is inconceivable to expect that within six years South Sudan would even begin
to establish the foundation for a viable modern state, something that most post-
independence states in Africa are still grappling with ﬁfty to sixty years after political
independence. So was the international community naive to assume that six years is
enough to begin the difﬁcult, complex, and sometimes chaotic process of state formation
and nation-building? The simple answer is no. It is instructive to note that the inter-
national community’s involvement in promoting the break-up of Sudan and propping
up post-independence nation-building interventions in South Sudan, framed by the
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liberal peacebuilding project, have been based on short-term, quick-ﬁx, and exit-strategy
orientation. It is therefore not surprising that the six-year time frame to ‘build’ the
structures and foundations for a new state was very much an exit strategy to allow the
main external backers of political independence in South Sudan to triumphantly state
‘mission accomplished’. Henceforth, the backers of independence in South Sudan will be
absolved from all blame if the new South Sudanese ruling and governing elites make a
mess of the new state they have produced for them.
Within the context of the independence euphoria and optimism about the future of
South Sudan, developing a coherent and coordinated programme for post-liberation-
war peacebuilding and nation-building was hardly at the top of the agenda of the
international community. If anything, and with the deployment of UNMIS, bureau-
cratic planning of the peacebuilding interventions became the immediate priority. The
demarcation of the militancy/security dimensions of peacebuilding from the critically
important areas of rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants as well as
security-sector reform and governance of the security agencies (SPLA and police
forces) was unhelpful. This demarcation of peacebuilding roles or division of labour
meant that the military/security functions of UNMIS received core UN funding whilst
the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants as well as the reform of the
security sector was expected to be funded on a voluntary basis by development agencies
and the international community. Within the UN system, this inevitably led to intense
competition for resource allocation and political leverage between and amongst UN
agencies, thereby undermining the coordination, coherence, timing, and sequencing of
post-war peacebuilding interventions.
Between  and  the new ruling and governing elites in South Sudan hardly
focused on building and developing the apparatus, structures, institutions, policies, and
decisions for a strong, viable, and modern new state. Rather than focus on the efﬁcient
political and economic management of the emerging state, the ruling and governing
elites preoccupied themselves with what Jean-François Bayart described as the ‘politics
of the belly’ and the worst forms of prebendal politics that did not make any distinction
between the public and the private realms of the new states and its emerging govern-
ance institutions (Bayart ; Clapham ; Francis : –). Within the context
of the vast opportunities created by neo-patrimonial governance in the new state, the
new ruling and governing elites were more interested in assuming control over the new
state and access to its patrimonial resources. The contestations, jostling for power, and
intensive, often violent competition amongst the political elites made the implosion
into civil war inevitable.
What is more, the timing and sequencing, if any, of the international community’s
post-war peacebuilding and nation-building in the particular case of South Sudan have
been determined, inﬂuenced, and shaped by developments and events on the ground as
well as the pursuit of the strategic interests of all the major backers who promoted the
break-up of Sudan and the independence of South Sudan. To put this in context, three
key events directly inﬂuenced and determined the nature and scope of the international
community’s intervention/involvement in South Sudan.
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Firstly, to facilitate the break-up of Sudan, generally perceived by most Western
governments as a rogue state that sponsored state terror1 (Lacey ), and to ensure
the independence of the largely Christian South Sudan from Islamic ‘Khartoum Sudan’,
the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was deployed between  and July . The
mandate of UNMIS was to monitor and support the implementation of the Compre-
hensive Peace Agreement that formally ended the twenty-two-year liberation war
between SPLA and the Khartoum government (UNSC ).
Secondly, the international concern and fear about an imminent war between the
newly independent South Sudan and Khartoum Sudan forced the establishment
and deployment of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). UNMISS was estab-
lished with a Chapter VII peace-enforcement, multidimensional peacekeeping man-
date to support the newly independent state, to consolidate peace and security, and to
‘use all necessary means’ to carry out its civilian protection mandate (UNSC ).
It was the international community’s concern that South Sudan posed a threat to
international peace and security in the region that forced the UN Security Council
to deploy UNMISS.
Thirdly, the outbreak of the civil war in December  produced two important
developments. It led to the dramatic overall increase in the troop strength of UNMISS
from , to , military personnel and from  to , police personnel. The
UNMISS budget, as of May , is US$,, billion.2 It also led to a shift in
posture of UNMISS from its primarily peacebuilding mandate to a focus on civilian
protection, nation-building, and post-war peacebuilding as a guarantor of long-term
peace, security, and development.
Based on the above outline, it is argued that the international community’s involve-
ment in post-independence nation-building and post-liberation-war peacebuilding was
largely driven and framed by developments on the ground. In fact, this rather ad-hoc
and improvised involvement in post-war peacebuilding is hardly a model of coherent,
coordinated, and predictable timing and sequencing. This is not to claim that the
international actors involved in South Sudan and, in particular, the UN, were oblivious
of the importance of coordination and coherence of post-war peacebuilding interven-
tions. The original mandate of UNMISS stressed the imperative for a ‘comprehensive
and integrated approach’ to post-war peacebuilding, the ‘need for coherent UN
activities [ . . . ] which requires clarity about roles, responsibilities and collaboration
between UNMISS and other UN Country Teams, and the need for cooperation with
other relevant actors in the region’, and a ‘more effective and coherent national and
international response’ to post-conﬂict peacebuilding (UNSC : –). However,
1 The Republic of Sudan, which before partition was Africa’s largest country and one of the world’s
most populous Islamic states, has been perceived by most Western governments as a rogue state that
sponsors state terror. The Islamist dictatorship under General Omar Al Bashir once hosted the
leader of al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, and provoked US military air strikes against the Khartoum
government by the Clinton Administration in . President Bashir is currently indicted by the
International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes committed against his people in the Darfur region.
2 UNMISS Mandate <http:www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/mandate.shtml>.
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this UN aspiration for a coordinated, coherent, and integrated approach to post-war
peacebuilding was hardly achieved as events on the ground dictated the level, nature,
scope, and even timing of peacebuilding and nation-building interventions. What is
more, all these developments happened within the complex and delicate politics of the
pursuit of vested interests by the key backers of South Sudan, including the Troika, the
African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), South
Sudan’s important neighbours such as Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya, and major
investors in the country’s new oil sector such as China. In addition, the  CPA
did not specify nor even mention the timing and sequencing of post-independence
peacebuilding and nation-building (Comprehensive Peace Agreement ). But to
understand the challenges and dilemmas for the timing and sequencing of post-conﬂict
peacebuilding, it will be useful at this stage to provide a context of the civil war in South
Sudan and how this singular development challenged the concept and practice of
timing and sequencing of peacebuilding interventions.
WHY THE NEW VIOLENT CONFLICT?
..................................................................................................................................
The current war was sparked off by violent clashes in December  between the pro-
government forces of President Salva Kiir and forces loyal to his sacked former vice
president Reik Machar. Allegations of an attempted military coup to overthrow
president Kiir’s government were refuted by Machar, and this escalated into a violent
war, with Reik Machar’s rebel faction now committed to overthrow Kiir’s government
by military means. The allegation of a coup attempt and subsequent armed rebellion
led to mass arrests and detentions of senior SPLM ruling-party members and former
cabinet ministers sacked by President Kiir in July , all perceived to be sympathetic
to Reik Machar. Despite the presence of a UN peacekeeping force with a Chapter VII
mandate for peace enforcement, the rebel faction made dramatic military gains by
capturing the strategic regional capitals of Bor, Bentiu, and the oil-rich Malakal in the
Upper Nile State. Uganda’s military intervention on the side of the government of
President Kiir has turned the tide against Machar’s rebel faction. By the end of January
, the government forces, supported by the superior ﬁre power of the Ugandan
military, have recaptured all the strategic towns and forced the rebel faction to
negotiate a political settlement of the crisis.3 Peace negotiations in Addis Ababa,
3 Uganda’s military intervention is driven by its own strategic national interests and geopolitical
considerations. Uganda has deployed two battalions of , soldiers and helicopter gunships. South
Sudan is a major commercial and intra-regional trading partner, providing signiﬁcant economic and
ﬁnancial gains for the government of Uganda. In addition, the ongoing conﬂict threatens the peace and
security of the country, in particular, the long-running Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) war in the
northern Uganda. Uganda’s military intervention is therefore a pre-emptive attempt to prevent any
relapse into further war in northern Uganda. I have been informed by senior military ofﬁcers in both the
SLPA and the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) that there is no love lost between President
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Ethiopia, led by the regional organization, IGAD, and South Sudan’s important
neighbours of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, with the support of Troika countries
(UK, USA, and Norway) and the EU, mediated a ceaseﬁre on  January  between
the government and the rebels. The war and implosion of the new state has claimed
more than , casualties, created . million internally displaced persons, and
caused an estimated half a million refugees to ﬂee to neighbouring countries (Global
Conﬂict Tracker ).
But what caused this civil war in less than three years of political independence from
Khartoum Sudan? The current conﬂict has been simpliﬁed as primarily about tribalism
or ethnic rivalry and the age-old violent struggle for power. But the current conﬂict
deﬁes this rather simplistic interpretation because those sacked by President Kiir in July
 and those political prisoners incarcerated after the December  armed rebel-
lion included those who do not support either Kiir or Machar and, in fact, do not
belong to the two dominant ethnic groups of Dinka and Nuer. This ethnic labelling of
the conﬂict is derived from the fact that some of the killings by both groups have been
targeted at the rival ethnic groups from which the two protagonists come. President
Kiir is not only a Dinka, but most of the senior government ministers are drawn from
his Dinka ethnic group.4 Similarly, Reik Machar is not only from the Nuer, one of the
two largest ethnic groups, but also the rank and ﬁle of the army are drawn from the
Nuer ethnic group.
Notwithstanding this, the current violent conﬂict has been triggered by a power
struggle within the SPLM ruling party: in particular, the bitter and irreconcilable
differences between President Kiir, who also serves as leader of the SPLM party, and
his sacked vice president Reik Machar. Kiir and Machar have not been close allies, but
worked together closely in the SPLA and SPLM during the liberation war. Machar and
other senior SPLM leaders have openly criticized President Kiir’s leadership in failing
to tackle rampant corruption and not delivering on the independence dividend of jobs,
food security, and delivery of social services. Machar and other senior SPLM leaders
with presidential ambitions have called on Kiir not to put forward his candidacy
for the  presidential elections (now postponed to ), openly accusing him of
Museveni of Uganda and Reik Machar because of his alleged military support for the LRA rebels and for
being used as proxy in the s by the Khartoum government to destabilize northern Uganda. There
are also allegations that President Bashir has provided covert military support for President Kiir. This
realpolitik intervention on the part of President Bashir is understandable because he has not welcomed
the ongoing war in South Sudan due to its devastating impact on Sudan’s economy and oil revenue,
against the background of domestic protests about rising unemployment and high living costs.
Massive refugee ﬂows into Khartoum Sudan also threaten the country’s security. It is alleged that Bashir
provides covert military support to bolster Kiir’s military victory and thus facilitate the normal oil
production and ﬂow of oil revenue. At the same time, Bashir wants to deny any military support by
Reik Machar’s rebel factions to the anti-Khartoum rebel forces in Southern Kondorfan. Both Bashir
and Kiir have found themselves in a peculiar situation of mutual interdependence.
4 The Dinkas are not a uniﬁed ethnic group and are further divided into socio-political and
hierarchical sub-groups of more than twenty-ﬁve different Dinka sections/clans. They comprise
 per cent of the population, with their own distinctive ethno-national ﬂag.
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authoritarian rule since assuming leadership of the SPLM in . Machar and all those
with presidential ambitions have raised unrealistic expectations for President Kiir to
deliver development and socio-political progress within a very short time.
The above interpretation gives the impression that the current opposition to Salva
Kiir’s government is largely made up of sacked former cabinet ministers and disgrun-
tled senior cadres of the SPLM. This is not the case. The opposition to Kiir’s govern-
ment is in fact a motley collection of disparate interest groups broadly categorized as a
political and military opposition. The political/civil opposition includes the widow of
the late SPLA/M leader, Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior Garang (now popularly
described as ‘mother of the nation’, who also has presidential ambitions), the sacked
SPLM Secretary-General, Pagan Amum Okiech, and the former Minister of Cabinet
Affairs, Deng Alor Kuol. The military opposition includes Reik Machar Teny, the
sacked elected governor of the oil-rich Unity State, Taban Deng Gai5, and several
senior military ofﬁcers commanding divisions in Malakal, Bentiu, and Bor. Both the
political and military opposition groups are united in a common purpose to remove
Kiir by political means and the scheduled democratic elections provided the oppor-
tunity to do so. However, and according to conﬁdential SPLM sources, the allegation is
that after his sacking, Machar had planned to remove Kiir by military means, so this
current war is part of a long-term plan to depose Kiir. But it is not clear whether
members of the so-called political opposition group knew about Machar’s military
objective. Both groups also operated with a high degree of suspicion and lack of trust, in
particular with regard to who should lead the groups upon the removal of Kiir.
According to SLPA intelligence sources, Machar’s pre-emptive military rebellion,
orchestrated as a mutiny in the Tiger Battalion (the main military command centre),
was in fact a strategic move to position himself as the main leader in the post-Kiir
period. In addition, local civil-society organizations, journalists, and rights-based
groups have persistently criticized President Kiir for failing to address increasing
insecurity and violence, rampant corruption, massive unemployment, and general
lack of socio-economic development. The response of Kiir’s government has been to
use the state security agencies, i.e. the military and police forces, to brutally crush all
forms of dissent and opposition to the SPLM government.
The fact that intense power struggles and political rivalry between and amongst key
leaders of the SPLM have degenerated into full-scale armed conﬂict is not unprece-
dented. Historically, power struggles within SPLA/M have often led to armed violence
and breakaway factions. The more than two decades of liberation war have seen
internecine armed conﬂicts within SPLA/M leadership. In  Reik Machar and
Akol Ajawin, the two deputies of the SPLA/M leader John Garang, were both forced
to break away from the SPLA in a failed attempt to depose Garang at the height of the
liberation war. This violent split, mobilized along the Dinka and Nuer ethnic lines, led
to reprisal massacres between Machar’s Nuer and Garang’s Dinka communities which
5 In September , President Salva Kiir sacked Governor Taban Deng Gai over corruption
allegations, using a presidential decree. This sacking was criticized as unconstitutional.
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lasted for seven years. There was no form of accountability for these atrocities nor any
justice for the victims of these politically mobilized massacres and violence. What is
clear is that power struggles amongst SPLA/M leaders often lead to violent conﬂict
along ethnic lines, whereby political leaders use the military and mobilize ethnic groups
for violence and mass killings. This current war follows the familiar historic patterns of
conﬂict that started with the liberation wars with Khartoum Sudan: ethnically-
orchestrated resource-based conﬂicts amongst cattle herding communities, and violent
power struggles and political rivalries between and amongst SPLA/M leaders. With the
common enemy, Khartoum Sudan, gone as a result of political independence, power
struggles amongst the political leaders have become increasingly ethnicized and hence
the call on their loyalists and constituencies within the fractious SPLA National Army
to achieve their political objectives.
MAPPING THE CRITICAL FAILURES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
..................................................................................................................................
In July  the new state was immediately called upon to demonstrate the multiple,
complex, and simultaneous tasks and responsibilities of a modern state, with only six
years of preparation for statehood after the signing of the CPA in . The CPA
provided for a permanent ceaseﬁre between the government of Khartoum and SPLA/M,
a power-sharing government, a wealth-sharing framework with South Sudan sharing
 per cent of the oil revenue, and political independence within six years. But the
charismatic SPLA/M leader John Garang died in a helicopter crash in August  and
was succeeded by Salva Kiir, his deputy leader. At the crucial moment when the birth of
South Sudan was being prepared for, the ‘midwife’ was removed from the scene. The
difﬁcult and complex task of state formation and nation-building was thrust on both
Salva Kiir and Machar (Machar was made deputy to Kiir in ). It was therefore
inevitable that, at birth, South Sudan was not prepared for statehood, nor did the
international community6 prepare for the development of a modern, viable, and
democratically accountable new state. According to Jok Makut Jok (: II), the
unravelling of the new state of South Sudan seem to have ‘caught the international
community within the country—represented by the United Nations, the European
Union, the African Union, and various diplomatic missions—totally off guard’. The
excessive preoccupation of key sections of the international community, in particular
6 The international community refers to all the diverse external actors and agencies involved in South
Sudan, in particular those governments and intergovernmental institutions that have been closely
associated with the liberation of South Sudan and its post-independence nation-building efforts.
They include the Sudan Troika, EU, UN, African Union, IGAD, IMF and World Bank, African
Development Bank, development cooperation partners, diplomatic missions, INGOs, and
international humanitarian relief agencies.
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the USA (government, Church, and Hollywood celebrities), to secure the independence
of South Sudan at all costs, detracted attention from the imperative to develop realistic
socio-economic development and governance agenda in the post-independence period.
WilliamWallis () captures this glaring neglect, stating that the ‘vicious conﬂict has
exposed the naivety of those self-appointed cheerleaders of Southern independence
abroad, who argued that all other issues were secondary to sovereignty [ . . . ]. But it is
also the case that many of the new state’s most ardent supporters have been guilty of
looking the other way, when things started going wrong—such was their desire to see
the project work.’
By all indications, the new ruling and governing elites were not only complicit, but
it was politically strategic to support the peace settlement as it made them ‘masters’ of
the new state, with control and access to power and the state’s patrimonial resources.
Their attitude and prebendal political instinct was very much the mantra of Kwame
Nkrumah—‘seek ye ﬁrst the political Kingdom and all else shall be added on to you’
(Biney ). For the political elites, the issue of timing and sequencing of post-war
peacebuilding was hardly on their agenda. However, and in fairness to them, it has
been difﬁcult to verify whether timing and sequencing of post-war peacebuilding was
ever part of the political settlement. It is reasonable to assume that in the context of
the independence euphoria the importance of timing and sequencing of peacebuild-
ing interventions was just simply neglected. In effect, the elite compromise in the
peace settlement was not the problem so much as the failure of leadership among
the new elites as well as the failures of the international community that created
an environment that was conducive to the implosion of the new state and the
descent into war.
UN’s Cautious Optimism amidst Increasing Violent
Political Tensions
The current crisis was one waiting to happen and the signs were apparent since
independence. The international community—in particular the Sudan Troika, the
UN, the EU, IGAD, and the African Union—ignored all the signs of the impending
implosion. After independence in July , the mandate of UNMIS was expanded and
renamed UNMISS to support the consolidation of peace, security, and conditions for
development of the new state. The UNMISS nation-building and peacebuilding man-
date was a Chapter VII mission, permitted to take ‘all necessary actions’ to protect
civilians, UN personnel, and humanitarian workers.7 A month before the outbreak of
the current war, the UN was expressing ‘cautious optimism’ about the country. The
head of UNMISS, Hilde Johnson, in her report to the UN Security Council in
November , expressed cautious optimism whilst acknowledging the internal
7 UNMISS’s current troop deployment capability is ,.
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security challenges stating that ‘South Sudan continues to face serious challenges in the
area of the promotion and protection of human rights. Key issues include prolonged
arbitrary detentions, excessive use of force and the arbitrary killings by ill-disciplined
security forces and agencies’ (Freund ).
Similarly, the UN Special Representative to South Sudan, Francis Deng’s statement
to the UN Security Council conﬁrmed the perception of cautious optimism and
progress made by the new state, stating, ‘The government has court martialled
those soldiers who committed abuses and has opened new investigations into abuses.
It is my belief that we have responded as fast as was possible in difﬁcult circumstances
to the need for justice and accountability’ (Freund ). Whilst the top UN ofﬁcials
in the country were busy reassuring the world that the international community
could not afford to see the failure of the world’s newest state, the country was
imploding before their very eyes. Yet this is a classic case of the UN and the
international community getting things wrong because of inadequate understanding
of domestic situations leading to ill-deﬁned and inappropriate policy responses. The
African Union for its part was preoccupied with the prospect of a war between
Khartoum Sudan and South Sudan over the disputed oil-rich Abyei region. Between
 and , UNMISS failed to protect civilians in the increasingly violent con-
frontations between rival militias and armed factions in Jonglei state and other parts
of the country. UNMISS was therefore criticized for its passivity, despite being
authorized with a peace-enforcement mandate to take ‘all necessary means’ to protect
civilians.
When President Kiir stripped Reik Machar of his vice-presidential powers in April
 because of political differences, the stage was therefore set for a violent confron-
tation. This was escalated in July  by President Kiir’s sacking of the entire cabinet,
including vice president Machar. These developments clearly indicated serious political
instability in the governance system, the dysfunctionality of the ruling SPLM party, and
the possibility of disgruntled senior political ﬁgures resorting to violence as the only
means to address their political grievances and their marginalization from the political
and economic processes of the country. Yet, by November , the UN and the
international community were still expressing cautious optimism about the future of
South Sudan. In fact, the African Development Bank approved a loan of US$million
on the same day that the armed conﬂict broke out.
Excessive Focus of the International Community on
Preventing Outbreak of War with Sudan
Since the signing of the CPA in , the international community, and in
particular the African Union (AU), has been preoccupied with preventing a full-
scale war between Khartoum Sudan and South Sudan over the disputed Abyei
region and border demarcation between both countries. After independence, the
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AU facilitated the development and implementation of nine Cooperation Agree-
ments as part of its roadmap for peaceful relations between both countries and for
the maintenance of regional security and stability. The AU roadmap Cooperation
Agreements were adopted by the AU Peace and Security Council on  April 
and the UN Security Council on  May  (Resolution ). Both Khartoum
Sudan and South Sudan signed the nine Cooperation Agreements on  September
, and on  March  they signed its implementation matrix, which pro-
vided the basis for trust, conﬁdence building, and cordial relations (Jumbert and
Rolandsen ).
The potential for war between the two countries was a major and increasingly
growing concern for the international community. This excessive international focus
on the possibility of imminent war between the two countries was justiﬁed. Even before
independence, there had been violent clashes over Abyei, and these escalated after
independence. These fears became manifest when Khartoum Sudan seized control of
Abyei, which prompted the involvement of the UN and the international community
to mediate the resolution of the disputed border region.8 At the height of the tensions
over Abyei, President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan threatened that ‘the oil of South Sudan
will not pass through Sudan ever again’ (BBC ). Violent clashes between the two
countries overshadowed the independence schedule and raised the spectre that there
would be no amicable separation. The US Senator, John Kerry (later Secretary of State),
described the situation during his visit to Juba as ‘ominously close to the precipice of
war’ (Copnall ).9 The UN Security Council Resolution  () determined
that the prospect of war between both countries constituted a threat to international
peace and regional security (UNSC ).
During the Abyei crisis, South Sudan was also grappling with a major armed
rebellion in Unity State, next door to Abyei, but this did not receive much international
attention.10 It was rather the prospect of a new war between the two countries that
exercised the attention of the international community, and the priority was to pull
back both belligerent states from the precipice of war. Inevitably, this distracted
attention from the equally immediate and complex task of nation-building.
8 In , the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling in The Hague adjudicated most of the oil ﬁelds
outside of Abyei’s borders. Both Sudan and South Sudan depend on oil revenues and  per cent of
South Sudan’s national budget is derived from oil revenue. But Abyei is still strategically important to the
patterns of violent conﬂict in South Sudan. Abyei is the centre of ethnic contestations for control over
grazing rights and resources between the Southern Dinka Ngot and the Northern Arab Misseriya
nomadic groups. The pastoralist and nomadic clashes over resources and grazing of cattle have been a
constant feature of the formation of violent conﬂict in the Abyei region.
9 During my capacity-building visits to Juba between –, there was palpable fear of a new war
with North Sudan and most of our discussions with senior SPLA ofﬁcers and some government
ministers were simply about preparation for a new war over Abyei.
10 According to intelligence reports, the government of Khartoum was alleged to have funded and
armed rebellion in Unity State to destabilize the prospect of full independence in South Sudan.
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Failure of Political Leadership and the Curse of the
Liberation Movement
The new ruling and governing elites, represented by the SPLM political party and SPLA
national army, bear much of the responsibility for the current crisis in South Sudan.
Since the creation of the SPLA and its political wing, the SPLM, in , it has been
plagued by authoritarian control and summary executions of political opponents. John
Garang, as leader of SPLA/M until his death in July , was known for his intoler-
ance of constitutional norms and democratic principles, and is alleged to have ordered
the summary execution of political rivals. Even Salva Kiir and Reik Machar fell out with
Garang. Kiir was accommodated because of the perception that he posed no threat to
Garang, unlike Machar, who is highly educated with a PhD in Engineering, articulate,
urbane, and ambitious. Kiir became the ‘accidental president’ by virtue of serving as
Deputy Leader of the SPLM. Machar, for his part, has never accepted the leadership of
Kiir, whom he perceives as uneducated and unﬁt to be president of South Sudan.
The SPLM has been riven by internal divisions and splits in  and  after the
failure of the Khartoum peace agreement. What kept it together as a ‘uniﬁed’ group was
the common struggle to break away from Khartoum Sudan and secure political
independence. With the attainment of political independence, the fostered solidarity
and unity was replaced by power struggles and political rivalries for the control of the
new state.
The recurrent power struggles within the SPLM illustrates the fact that the inter-
national community failed to appreciate that the SPLM was not a legitimate and
democratically accountable political party based on a popular mandate. The SPLM
leadership, in particular Salva Kiir and Reik Machar, are experienced liberation ﬁghters
who, during the liberation struggle, never respected the constitutional provisions and
demands placed on the SPLM. They always used the exigencies of the liberation war to
justify any fragrant breach of SPLM constitutional principles or intolerance to demo-
cratic freedoms. It is therefore not surprising that at independence the SPLM ruling
and governing elites who found themselves in control of the new state simply con-
tinued with ‘business as usual’, i.e., disregard for constitutional and democratic prin-
ciples. However, they paid lip service to respect for constitutional procedures and
democratic norms insofar as it provided the opportunity for access to donor funding.
The ruling SPLM and returning diaspora now became the governors of the new state
and rapidly became the manifestation of the ‘politics of the belly’ (Bayart ). In that,
the new ruling SPLM used their political leadership not for efﬁcient political and
economic management of the state but simply to privatize, informalize, and subvert
the ofﬁcial state governing institutions for personal aggrandizement. The ruling SPLM
monopolized state governance and now has  per cent of parliamentary seats,
essentially running a one-party state. The new ‘governors’ of the new state became
the ‘nouveau riche’ and purveyors of patrimonial largesse to their ethnic groups,
supporters, and loyalists in the military, hardly making any distinction between the
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public and private realm of the state. This neo-patrimonial leadership of the ruling
SPLM led to rampant corruption, bad governance, and the use of the state military and
police agencies to crush any opposition and dissent to their rule. Barely two months
after independence, the unconstitutional sacking of Malik Agar, the elected SPLM-N
governor of the Blue Nile State sparked armed violence in the region.
To all intents and purposes, the ruling SPLM party became a law unto itself,
disregarding constitutional principles, democratic values, and respect for fundamental
rights. The SPLM leadership simply behaved as a ‘Liberation Army’, intolerant of all
democratic principles and constitutional practices. The majority of the SPLM leader-
ship were still stuck in the ‘Liberation Movement’ mentality and failed to grasp the
import of governing a new state based on accountable and transparent constitutional
principles and democratic practices. This is not surprising, because no effort was made
during the liberation struggle and the six years preparation for statehood after the
signing of the CPA to transform the SPLM into a legitimate and democratically
accountable political party. With the attainment of independence, the SPLM govern-
ment still ran the new state on the outdated ‘Liberation Movement’ structures with the
Political Bureau (the highest decision-making body of the SPLM) and the National
Liberation Council (the SPLM legislature) as the principal political party governance
structures of the new state.
In effect, the SPLM did not bother to develop strong, viable, disciplined, and modern
political party institutions, with a clear socio-economic and development agenda
to take the new country forward after independence. This glaring lack of a post-
liberation-war development agenda created the opportunity for humanitarian and
development agencies to lead the provision of social and welfare services. It becomes
clear that at independence, South Sudan was not really a state with the capacity to
demonstrate the performance criteria of statehood beyond the international legal
recognition of statehood. What is more, South Sudan was a weak state because its
political, economic, development, and security/military institutions were malleable, if
not, dysfunctional. The new state had no control over the use of force in its territory,
with no proper functioning democratically accountable political party or parties. To
compound this already difﬁcult situation, the international community failed to appre-
ciate the enormity of the nation-building challenges and the type of state governing
institutions that they were dealing with. The majority of the international actors in
South Sudan—and even the key backers of the new state—simply regarded the SPLA as
being ‘just like any other rebels and armies in Africa’.11 The head of UNMISS,
displaying a similar lack of appreciation of the immediate and complex nation-building
challenges, stated: ‘Of course, there is much to be done to strengthen and develop
democratic institutions, but it is important to acknowledge that these have been put in
place’ (BBC ).
11 Comment by UK diplomat in .
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Failure to Transform the SPLA into a National Army
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant neglect by the local political elites and the international
community has been the failure to support the transformation of the SPLA into a
professional, trained, and accountable peacetime national army that is subjected to
civilian democratic control and oversight. The SPLA was never a uniﬁed force, but a
collection of competing ethnic groups and afﬁliations including Nuers, Dinkas, Shil-
luks, Mandari, Barya, and Acholis, with warlords leading these ethnic constellations.
Historically, the SPLA has been an enforced uniﬁed ﬁghting force, united against the
common enemy, Khartoum Sudan. Though a formidable combatant, the SPLA was
never an organized and professional military force. Garang’s personalized leadership
made sure that the SPLA was a factionalized and poorly organized group.
The SPLA’s ethnic base and military capability have been the political constituency
of the leaders of the SPLM in the post-independence period. This posed a serious
challenge for transforming the SPLA into a national army subject to civilian democratic
control. How could the new political leaders curtail their politico-military constituency
through any democratically accountable security-sector reform process? The majority
of the political leaders of the new state, including Salva Kiir and Reik Machar, owe their
position to their military constituency.
A major problem is that the government’s disarmament, demobilization, and reinte-
gration programme, implemented since , has not been successful. Even before the
outbreak of the new war, South Sudan has been awash with small arms and light
weapons, partly due to the failure of the disarmament process and the proliferation of
small arms in the pastoralist communities of Lakes, Jonglei, Eastern Equatorial, and
Upper Nile states. By , when the CPA was signed, the SPLA was one of several
military factions in South Sudan. Others included the Khartoum-funded rival South
Sudan Defence Forces. These disparate military forces were simply incorporated into
the new national army, and their leaders given positions in the government and army,
with access to oil revenue. It is therefore not surprising that  per cent of the national
budget is spent on defence.
The ruling SPLM government has often preferred quick-ﬁx solutions and comprom-
ises to buy off armed groups and militias that threaten national security and stability.
Large military forces and militias have been integrated into the SPLA national army
without the proper professional training and standard requirements. The poor man-
agement of the reform of the security sector has led to the situation whereby the SPLA
national army has no practical and coherent common ethos and lacks discipline and
respect for authority.12 The failure of disarmament and the reform of the security
sector created a militarized environment in which disputing political leaders will turn
to the politicized and ethnically motivated army for support. According to de Waal and
12 During my visits to South Sudan I am constantly shocked by the reckless indiscipline of SPLA
soldiers. They have no respect for civilians, do not recognize or obey any trafﬁc regulations, and often
drive dangerously amongst civilians.
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Mohammed (), ‘The army was little more than a coalition of ethnic units tied
together by cash handouts. Successive efforts to establish a centralized roster of soldiers
were thwarted. Too often, disarmament operations became ethnically selective, leaving
disarmed communities open to attack by their neighbours. In , when Kiir prom-
ised to “name and shame” corrupt army commanders, those commanders forced him
to retract.’ In effect, there has been no serious effort and investment to transform a
liberation army into a national defence force.
CONCLUSION: INVESTMENT IN POST-WAR
PEACEBUILDING AND NATION-BUILDING
..................................................................................................................................
These failures have, therefore, led to the usual ill-deﬁned international responses and
solutions in the form of a civil-war peace settlement that will be foisted on South
Sudan. The international community, and in particular the Troika, EU, UN, and the
African Union, are backing the IGAD-led peace process in Ethiopia between the
government of President Kiir and the rebel faction led by Reik Machar. By all
indications, this external mediation of the current war in South Sudan will end up
producing the all-too-familiar African civil-war peace settlement, starting with a
ceaseﬁre agreement that will establish a power-sharing government between President
Kiir’s regime and Reik Machar’s rebel faction, guaranteed by the international com-
munity and enforced by the deployment of an expanded UNMISS with a robust
peacekeeping mandate. But all these short-term, quick ﬁx, and exit-strategy-oriented
interventions are bound to unravel with the next outbreak of violent conﬂict because
the fundamental grievances and urgent nation-building imperatives are not addressed
by the key Western and African backers of South Sudan simply because of the lack of
long-term commitment to nation-building and post-war peacebuilding.
The case study of South Sudan has demonstrated that the country is hardly a good
model for the timing and sequencing of post-conﬂict peacebuilding. If anything, South
Sudan illustrates how events on the ground and the pursuit of strategic interests by the
local political elites and of the key external states predetermine, frame, and inﬂuence
the timing, scope, and even the nature of post-war peacebuilding interventions.
However, this false start by the world’s newest state may be just the opportunity needed
to develop and implement a coherent, integrated, coordinated, and predictable peace-
building intervention in South Sudan. The important lesson of the new civil war is that
it has foisted on all the key stakeholders, major powers, and intergovernmental
institutions the imperative to work together on all issues relating to post-war peace-
building and nation-building. In fact, the civil war has led to increased and enhanced
collaboration, coordination, integration, and sequencing of peacebuilding and nation-
building intervention activities at national and international levels, as well as between
UNMISS, the UN Country Team, the AU, IGAD, the African Union-UN Hybrid
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Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA),
and the UN Stabilization Mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO).
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